Poland as European Regional Power

In 2009, the prestigious American geopolitical analyst George Friedman wrote a controversial book titled "The next 100 years. A forecast for the XXI century" in which, among other events, predicts that in this century Poland will reach a position as European regional power.

Maybe, Freedman´s forecast might seem extremely optimistic for Poland, considering the economic backwardness suffered after 40 years of planned economy (1945-1989), the effects of which still impact today this central European country -the Polish GDP/per capita, remains below the EU average-, along with other factors as a low demographic dynamism –the population of Poland is stagnated from mid-80´s-, or its historical dependency from other powers, as since 1919 to 1939 was closely linked to France and Britain, and from 1945 to 1989  was subdued in a firm soviet military tutelage and consequently acted just as a USSR satellite. 

Therefore, Poland has few possibilities to become in a European power by itself, but, despite all this, the Friedman theory is plausible if this nation acts intelligently and, with American support obtains the leadership of a new block of Central and Eastern European countries. An idea that holds similarities with the ambitious “intermarium plan” conceived by Josef Pildsudski –the first president of Poland- in the 1920´s.

The Intermarium Plan

The “intermarium plan” could be defined as a strategy to create a new continental power capable of protecting Poland and its neighbors from Russian and German appetences. To achieve this objective, Pilsudski posed the union among Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, and later -when the Polish army failed in its attempts to invade Ukraine, in 1921- replaced this idea by other alternatives such as a confederation among the Central European, Balkan and Baltic States. When all these possibilities were finally discarded, France, that was the only European power to support these projects, tried to seek other options inspired in the same Intermarium concepts. In this way, the French, who during the 1920´s had built a network of alliances with the new Central European countries –including Poland-, encouraged alliances among its Central European and Balkan friends. The little entente was an example of this policy, an alliance that involved Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and whose function was to assist France in a hypothetical war against Germany, threatening the German southern flank, but also to control the Hungarian territorial claims on the three countries and build a chain of buffer states against the Soviet Communism.

Poland did not join the little entente by its territorial disputes with Czechoslovakia, but after the Second World War, like the other soviet satellites was forced to join the Warsaw Pact and the CAME. Under the strict conditions of the Soviet control, these countries interacted for the next 40 years in different matters; harmonized its economies, its armed forces, its political rules, and ironically, also its opposition movements. All these conditions were decisive to forge strong similarities among them and to fix common strategies to face the future challenges after the fall of the communist regimes. In 1993, once dissolved these soviet sponsored organizations; Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary decided to found a new association –the Visegrad group- to prepare its future addition to EU and to keep the links established during the Soviet period. 

The Visegrad group

Meanwhile, the Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe in 1989 caused a geopolitical empty finally covered by the USA. The Polish, eager to receive the American aid, accepted enthusiastically this approximation that, in fact, was essential for both sides, since the USA obtained the necessary logistical facilities to advance its Eurasian strategic positions and reach the borders of Ukraine. In exchange, Poland, just as the other former European soviet satellites, received the American assistance to improve its economy and prevent any hostile Russian reaction. 

In addition, the Polish foreign political agenda designed by the USA and described by Zbignew Brzezinski in his excellent book “The grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its geostrategic Imperatives", published in 1997, was absolutely accomplished when Poland joined the EU and NATO in 1999 and 2003 respectively, which implied its total inclusion in the Western sphere. But not all the American plans to reorganize Europe have been fulfilled.  One of the most important Brzezinki´s unrealized proposals was a new military structure that should to include Poland, Germany and France and in an early future also Ukraine -which by its geographical position at the gates of Russia, has acquired a geopolitical condition of pivotal country-. According to Brzezinski´s conception, this block would act as a new core of European defense, but it´s obvious that its real mission would be centered in guaranteeing a hid Western presence in Ukraine through Germany and Poland.

Brzezinski proposal

Different factors made not possible the achievement of this purpose. The relations of Poland with its EU partners were not as easy as with the USA, because Poland still kept bad memories about the ineffective French alliance in the interwar period but especially about the German expansionism in the XX century and the German occupation during the Second World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that the traditional Polish mistrust toward Germany grew after the German reunification and the mirage of an EU under a German leadership.  As result, Poland and its neighbors always have seen the American alliance much more desirable than the EU association.

In any way, the central stumbling block to this defensive community came from France, which since the end of the Second World War had tried to recover its old position as European continental power, for this reason the French distrusted the American hegemony over Western Europe and opposed to the American lead role in the intra-European affairs. The French disagreement to this situation caused that in 1958 France left NATO´s military structure. At the same time, since the 1960´s, France has tried to advance in a strategic approach with Germany -the so called Franco-German reconciliation-, to build a new European bloc through the EU capable to counterbalance the American preeminence in Europe. The end of the cold war, gave a new vigor to the Franco-German relationship which reached its peak at the beginning of 1990´s when the European unification process gained a renewed impetus and even seemed possible furthering into a real political union. But the Franco-German successes sharing the EU leadership did not disrupt the German compliant dependency to the USA, basically because the Germans were conscious that the American protection was essential and could not be replaced by France. All these reasons made that France would be little receptive to accept that its special relation with Germany, could be interfered by a strongly pro-American country that in addition could not provide any important extra strategic or tactical advantage but a dangerous tension with Russia.

The 9/11 attacks and arrival of George W Bush to the presidency of the USA, supposed to adopt the “democratic imperialism” doctrine that polarized the positions within the NATO and EU, especially after the second Gulf war. One of the effects of the American unilateralism was that Germany sided with France in its opposition against the invasion of Iraq, an action that broke the traditional German complicity with the US foreign policy. On the contrary, Poland and the “Visegrad group” endorsed with the American decision. As result, George Bush used the terms “new Europe” and “old Europe” to redefine the American preferences in Europe, and obviously Poland, as a loyal American ally, was part of the “new Europe” conception. 

A key moment in this relationship, which continued and even increased during the Obama presidency, arrived in 2013 when the EU, with the American consent, tried to attract Ukraine to its sphere. Putin could not accept this event, as recognize the EU primacy in Ukraine implied to accept its inclusion in the Western bloc and consequently a direct military menace to the Russian borders.

Unlike Yeltsin presidency, who did nothing to avoid the NATO´s penetration in the former Warsaw Pact countries, neither inside the former Soviet space (the Baltic republics), Putin responded the EU intentions through a low intensity war and inciting the pro-Russian regions to rebel against the new pro UE Kiev government and blackmailing all Central and Western Europe with a cut of gas supplies.   

The Russian intervention intensified the division between Eastern Ukraine -with a Russian orthodox population- which maintained its loyalty to the overthrown pro-Russian president, and the Western Ukraine -with a cultural and religious proximity with Poland- which stood by the new pro EU government. At this point, it is necessary to remember something predicted in 1997, by Samuel Huntington in his book "The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the new order" about the possible segregation of Eastern Ukraine to join Russia (something that happened partially with Crimea). Huntington believed that this scenario would push politically the rest of Ukraine to the west, a theory confirmed with the Russian annexation of Crimea, which finally has resulted in a Ukraine more ethnically Ukrainian and less confident to Russia.

The Slav roots shared among the Visegrad group members conform a vital element to achieve an Ukrainian rapprochement to this group, and also can help to attract other Balkan nations as Slovenia and Croatia (not so with Serbia and other Slav-Orthodox contries). Hungary is the only member that has different cultural backgrounds, but its inclusion in this group comes from its unique national condition, and its traditional good relations with Poland, along with its geographic location as connecting point between the South and North Slavs.

With all these elements, the role of Poland in the future of Ukraine will become crucial, because the fears of both countries towards Russia will force them to harmonize a strong military and diplomatic collaboration, as a renewed version of the old Intermarium plan. This alliance is especially necessary to confirm the Westernization of Ukraine and avoid other Russian annexations in the East. Meanwhile, in the EU´s arena, Poland can use the reluctances against some EU values exposed by the “Visegrad group” countries (caused by its nationalistic positions, its uncertainties about the EU political integration, and its hostility against the Muslim refugees), to defy the Franco-German axis and organize its own sphere of influence inside EU, which could include the three little Baltic Republics. In this scenario, Poland would have enough weight to determine the EU foreign policy priorities, and coordinate these ones with its interests in Ukraine (that eventually could coincide with Germany, with important investments there) and finally reach the rank of regional power.

 

Poland as European regional power

Without doubt, the projection of the Polish power has to follow a notorious improvement of its economy which should help to reinforce its leadership role. During the two first decades of the XXI century Poland has shown its capacity to overcome the Great Recession. From now on, Poland must prove the enduring of these successes and its ability to use them to impulse its foreign policies, replacing the Russian investments in Ukraine or taking the initiative in Belarus; Moscow´s closest ally.